nginx released versions 1.30.7 (stable branch) and 1.31.9 (mainline branch) on November 18, 2026. The official changelog lists ten security fixes in 1.31.9 and nine in 1.30.7. Five of them make up the set that Xint.io, the company that found them, named nginx2root. The most serious, CVE-2026-123007, is an overflow in the HTTP/2 flow control window that can crash an nginx worker process and, according to the changelog, "might have potential other impact". It only requires HTTP/2 to be enabled, and the affected code has been there since version 1.9.5, released in 2015.
What the two releases fix
The five nginx2root flaws depend on different configurations. The summary below follows the changelog and the table published by Cloudflare:
CVE | When the server is exposed |
|---|---|
CVE-2026-123007 | HTTP/2 enabled |
CVE-2026-123633 | HTTP/2 with proxy_pass and insufficient worker_connections |
CVE-2026-121810 | HTTP/3 (QUIC) with proxy_pass and insufficient worker_connections |
CVE-2026-123634 | resolver with the same name resolved at the same time in subrequests |
CVE-2026-113425 | mail proxy with auth_http |
According to Cloudflare, F5, which owns nginx, rates each one High under CVSS 3.1 (8.1) and Critical under CVSS 4.0 (9.2). The same source notes that running code through the attack requires bypassing ASLR (address space layout randomization), and that Xint's write-up shows how CVE-2026-123007 leaks addresses to do exactly that.
The other five fixes cover a buffer overflow when try_files and alias are used together in some configurations (CVE-2026-125283), an endless loop while reading the request body over TLS (CVE-2026-118899), two flaws in the stream module with SSL (CVE-2026-120967 and CVE-2026-123640), and a flaw with PROXY protocol version 2 and dynamic certificate loading (CVE-2026-120993). That last one appears only in the 1.31.9 changelog. Both releases also start rejecting header lines without a colon and chunked request bodies with too much framing overhead, which may affect clients that were sending malformed requests and getting away with it.
Who needs to act
Any server delivering a site or API through nginx with HTTP/2 falls into the group exposed to the main flaw. That includes the common nginx plus PHP-FPM setup used for WordPress and Laravel, reverse proxies in front of Node.js applications, and internal load balancers. In the Censys count cited by Cloudflare, about 8.8 million services were running a potentially affected version with HTTP/2 enabled on November 19. Cloudflare itself points out that a version string does not prove a host is vulnerable, because Linux distributions backport fixes into packages without changing the displayed version.
Teams running nginx behind Cloudflare or another proxy that terminates the HTTP/2 connection have partial protection. Cloudflare says the control frames used in the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 attacks end at its edge and never reach the origin. That only holds if the origin does not accept direct connections from the internet, and it does not cover the resolver flaw or the mail proxy. In practice, the proxy buys time to update without replacing the update.
Managed hosting and PaaS change who does the work, but someone still has to confirm it was done. If the contract or the dashboard does not show the nginx version or the distribution package, the question goes to the provider.
What to do now
Update to 1.30.7 or 1.31.9. According to endoflife.date, 1.28 and older branches no longer receive fixes, so a server stuck on one of them needs to move to a new branch, not just a new version. If you install from your distribution's package, check its security advisory and the fixed package number, because the nginx version may stay the same.
Until the update lands, disabling HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 removes the precondition for the three protocol flaws, at a performance cost for anyone who relies on them. If you already have a proxy in front, close the origin: accept only the proxy's addresses at the firewall, use an outbound tunnel, or require a client certificate on the connection.
Cloudflare lists log messages that help look for attempts. The most visible ones with the default configuration are worker process <pid> exited on signal 11 on servers with HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 and proxying, and could not cancel <name> resolving, which only appears on unpatched versions.
What is still unknown
As of November 18, none of the five CVEs was in CISA's catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities, and Cloudflare says it had not seen reports of real-world exploitation as of November 19. Rapid7 published a proof of concept for a local container; Xint and Wiz have not released their exploits, and fake "exploits" are circulating on GitHub. nginx2root also includes a flaw in the Linux kernel's SCTP module that lets someone already running code as the nginx user become root. As of November 18 there was no kernel fix, and Xint is withholding the details until there is one. Since many distributions load the SCTP module on demand, keep an eye on your distribution's advisory over the coming weeks, even after updating nginx.
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